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I.

Introduction
The internet is the modern-day equivalent of the high seas in the 18th century. In the

1700s merchant ships carried goods across oceans which were not under the control of any
nation. The more time that passed, the more it became apparent that protections needed to be put
in place to prevent abuse of the seas. The lawlessness of the ocean enticed people who sought to
profit into ventures of theft and commandeering. These pirates plundered ships and eventually
caused the international community to create laws to combat their activities, thus criminalizing
and effectively reducing the amount of piracy. The analogy of the high seas being the
unregulated highway by which goods move internationally is directly on point to what the
internet is today. The internet is not governed by any one nation and this chaos has attracted
unruly behavior just like that of the pirates of centuries past. Similarly, these malicious internet
actors can be likened to pirates in a sense, yet there seems to be little interest in passing proactive
legislation on the international level to scale down the threat of internet crime.

Although often thought of as existing a cloud, somewhere high up, linked via satellites
and connecting a world of people instantaneously, the internet is truly the equivalent of the high
seas with underwater cables stretching entire oceans between countries. In fact, only a minor
portion of internet data is even transmitted via satellite connections with between 95 to 99
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percent of data flowing beneath the surface of the oceans.1 Additionally these underwater routes
operate at up to 8 times faster than any satellite connection, making them very efficient.2 These
oceanic lines are limited to about 448 separate cables which each are normally as wide as a
household garden hose and at most as wide as a soda can. 3

In this paper, we will examine security risks surrounding the undersea cables networks by
weighing the criteria set forth by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS offers
an evaluative matrix tool called the Facility Security Level. I have evaluated the internet cables
according to these standards and have rendered a score of “Level IV” for the cable infrastructure.
The decisions process and weighing of factors will be explored later in this paper. Additionally,
we will discuss the attractiveness of targeting undersea cables by both terrorists and state actors.
Lastly, we will examine the broader scope of how undersea cables, and cyberspace, fit into the
definitions of war and international law of human rights.

This paper is an argument for the government of the United States to pressure the world
community to draft treaties to protect the undersea internet cables, establishing criminal
liabilities, prosecutorial procedures, and a body of representatives (similar to the United Nations)

1

Douglas Main, Undersea Cables Transport 99 Percent of International Data, NEWSWEEK,
(Apr. 2, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/undersea-cables-transport-99-percentinternational-communications-319072.
2
Id.
3
Submarine Cables Frequently Asked Questions, TELEGEOGRAPHY,
https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions, (last visited
Mar. 20, 2018).
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to oversee security provisions. It is the recommendation of this position paper for the United
States to take initiative to pressure the international community, through the United Nations, to
provide protection to the undersea cables, both physically and virtually, through deterrent
measures including physical force and proportional countermeasures aimed at aggressors
(independent and state actors) to hold them accountable for actions in cyberspace.

II.

History
Underwater lines for data communication are not a new phenomenon, it is a practice

which has been in practice for nearly 170 years. Beginning in the 1850s companies began to
utilize underwater cables to transmit telegraph traffic internationally across oceans with the first
transmission occurring in August 1858 between the United States and Great Britain with Queen
Victoria congratulating President Buchanan.4 The initial message took 17 hours to transmit but a
second attempt took only 67 minutes.5

III.

Security Classification
The US Department of Homeland Security chairs a committee called the Interagency

Security Committee (ISC). The ISC was created by an executive order by President Bill Clinton
six months after the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995.6 The purpose of this committee was to

4

Donard de Cogan, Dr E.O.W. Whitehouse and the 1858 Trans-Atlantic Cable, HISTORY OF
http://atlantic-cable.com/Books/Whitehouse/DDC/index.htm, (last visited Mar.
22, 2018).
5
Id.
6
Interagency Security Committee, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC,
https://www.dhs.gov/interagency-security-committee, (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
TECHNOLOGY,
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establish an interdepartmental cooperative among more than two dozen federal agencies to
analyze and assess risks to “enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in and protection of
buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary
activities”7.

The ISC in its examination of federal facilities states that critical infrastructure features
such as dams, highways, and bridges are generally not included under the definition of
“facilities” yet are rather classified as “high risk symbolic or critical infrastructure”.8 The
definition of infrastructure according to Merriam Webster is: the system of public works of a
country, state, or region; also : the resources (such as personnel, buildings, or equipment)
required for an activity.9 The undersea cables which will be examined in this paper should be
classified as a form of infrastructure as they are equipment which serves as a system of public
works by providing internet, just as water lines and power plants are parts of infrastructure. As
part of the critical infrastructure set forth in the DHS Report the ISC added that the report was
“not written with application to these structures in mind, the methodology upon which it is based

7

Exec. Order No. 12977, 60 Fed. Reg. 54411 (Oct. 24, 1995).
The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee
Standard (November 2016/2nd Edition), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC,
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-risk-management-process, (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
9
Infrastructure, Merriam Webster Dictionary (2018)
8
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is applicable [to infrastructures]”.10 Therefore we will examine the threats posed to undersea
cables with the same methodology which is used to examine federal facilities.

The standard by which risks to a structure are formulated into the Facility Security Level
(FSL) determinations range from levels I through V. After determinations are made it is the
responsibility of tenants (in our case, owners) to establish risk management plans and provide
appropriate funds to countermeasure risks.11 The FSL has correspondence to a security matrix
which measures a variety of criteria and assigns point values to each factor which is then
calculated to determine the proper FSL level. There are five factors in the matrix which are
equally weighted and appointed point values of 1,2,3, or 4. 12 The sum of these values determine
which classification of threat is present.

a. Mission Criticality
The first factor in the matrix is called “mission criticality” and is weighed by the function
of the location and its importance to the federal government. It is acknowledged that there is an
attraction for adversaries of the United States to seek to disrupt important government functions
and missions.13 Under the first factor of mission criticality one of the criteria to be assigned a
value of 4 ( “very high”) is that the location houses essential communications and necessary

10

See The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities, supra note 4.
Id.
12
Id. at 6
13
Id. at 8
11
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equipment with an example being listed as “intelligence community facilities, including
communications”.14 It seems appropriate that the cables which supply internet would be included
under this criteria for essential communications. Additionally, other criteria within the 4 point
range is facilities which house specialized equipment to regulate national fiscal or monetary
policies. The undersea cables transmit the information required to operate national and
international financial markets, yet another compelling reason they should be assigned a point
value of 4 in the first mission criticality factor.

b. Symbolism
The next factor in the threat matrix is labeled as “symbolism” and essentially is
calculated by the attractiveness of the location as a target as well as the consequence of a wouldbe attack. The symbolic attractiveness is based on things such as appearance, publicized
operations, or perceived importance. The ISC also lists communication centers as examples of
targets which would be prioritized by groups which seek to damage the American economy.15 It
can be assumed that the effects of an attack would be catastrophic if carried out effectively. Also,
as a communication medium which would disrupt and damage the American economy the
physical embodiment of the internet is highly symbolic and attractive to terrorist or foreign

14
15

Id.
Id. at 10-11
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forces. Given the gravity of an attack coupled with the attractiveness I classify this factor as a 3
on the matrix (“high”).

c. Facility Population
The third factor of the matrix is Facility population. The ISC states that many terroristic
goals include the mass casualties associated with attacks.16 On the matrix scale the lowest point
level of 1 includes the criteria of less than 100 people. It can be assumed with a high level of
certainty that an attack on any undersea cable would result in less than 100 deaths. The cables are
mostly unmanned and the motivation for such attacks is based more on the structural
compromise than the threat to human life. For these reasons, I classify the third factor on the
matrix as a level 1 threat (“low”).

d. Facility Size
The fourth factor is called “facility size” and relates to the square footage which the
targeted area takes up. The space of the target typically correlates to the amount of media
coverage which is associated with an attack; i.e. if terrorists were to destroy a single post office
location it would likely get moderate to high coverage in local and regional media depending on
circumstances, yet if a large mail sorting facility or national mail facility were targeted the
coverage would be more widespread and in depth. The space which the undersea cables occupy
is beyond vast with some single cables spanning 25,000 miles. The ISC considers that size may

16

Id. at 12
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also be a deterrent for facilities to be attacked because “large facilities require a more substantial
attack to create catastrophic damage, entailing more planning and preparation by adversaries that
could be a deterrent”.17 The deterrent effect in relation to size is not present in the case of
internet cables due to the fact that the area which cables occupy are no large but are not
centralized, they are spread for miles and miles with little supervision of most of the space. Also
the notion that larger targets require a very substantial attack are unable to be applied to this
scenario as the unguarded cables are only 6 inches in diameter at most points. For all of these
reasons the classification should be a 4 on the matrix (“very high”).

e. Threat to Tenant Agencies
The fifth and final factor of the FSL threat matrix is classified as “threat to tenant
agencies”. This factor is somewhat unrelated to the idea of an undersea cable, yet based on
criteria set forth in the matrix, any facility with little to no contact with the public falls into a
score of 1 (“low”). I will disagree with this assessment of the internet cables for several reasons.
Part of the consideration in this section of the matrix calls for an evaluation of the interaction
between the target facility and the public. Also, past and credible threats against the target are
used as criteria for determining this factor. The cables, being in the middle of the ocean has
obviously caused there to be virtually no interaction with the cables and the public. Also,
previous threats should not be determinative to the risk assessment of any target. Previous threats

17

Id. at 13
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are not always precursors to future attack or threats. Another point of interest in this fifth factor
is whether the facility is located in a high, moderate, or low crime area. This is hardly a
consideration which terrorist groups consider when planning attacks. The symbolism and
attractiveness of a target far outweigh the fact of what type of crime area it is located within.
Regardless of my disagreement with the considerations present in this factor of the matrix, I will
follow the criteria in order to maintain analytical consistency with the rest of the model and thus
assign a point value of 1 for this factor.

In summation of the five FSL matrix factors my analysis concludes with a raw score of
13 points by combining the scores of each factor. This score according to the matrix places the
internet cables at a level III FSL.

IV.

Implications and Fragility of the Cables as Infrastructure
Legal experts estimate that the daily traffic of financial institutions which flows over the

undersea cable has a valuation of well over $1 trillion dollars. Global banking, stock exchange,
and other commodity markets traded over the internet are gravely affected by any disruption. A
good way to measure and appreciate the detriment which these interruptions cause is to examine
times in which inadvertent interruptions took place. In December 2006 an earthquake damaged 9
undersea cables near Taiwan. The repair took approximately 49 days to be completed by several
teams of ships. Chunghwa Telecom, which is one of Taiwan’s largest telecom companies
reported outages of 100 percent of its communications into Hong Kong and a 74 percent
11 |

interruption in communications to China. The two largest internet providers in China reported
about 90 percent outages on all internet traffic flowing from China to the United States and
Europe. 18

The damages which have occurred to undersea cables up to today have been the result of
natural disaster or human error. Many cables are damaged each year by things such as anchors
dropped or dragged by ships and fishing nets which are trawled along the ocean floor to catch
fish.19 Additionally in an effort to minimize the unintentional damage from commercial practices
like fishing, the locations of cables are publicly available information20(See also; Exhibits B and
C). The reason for releasing this information is so that vessels traversing the ocean are aware of
the locations and avoid damaging the cables, yet by making this information public it could
potentially be used for other means.

V.

International Coalitions
The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) is an organization devoted to the

preservation of undersea cables and provides leadership and guidance on issues related to

18

Winston Qiu, Submarine Cables Cut after Taiwan Earthquake in Dec 2006, SUBMARINE
CABLE NETWORKS, (Mar. 19, 2011), https://www.submarinenetworks.com/news/cables-cut-aftertaiwan-earthquake-2006.
19
Michael Matis, The Protection of Undersea Cables: A Global Security Threat, U.S. ARMY
WAR COLLEGE, CABLE NETWORKS, (July. 3, 2012), www.dtic.mil/get-tr- doc/pdf?AD=A
DA561426.
20
Id.
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undersea cable security and reliability.21 The committee has membership with countless
companies and governments across the globe, with members including the United States Navy,
JP Morgan Chase, Sprint, AT&T and over 170 other organizations. Through their research, the
ICPC has been able to place a dollar value on the cost of outages across undersea cables. They
estimate that any single high-bandwidth undersea cable suffering an outage can cost companies
and governments about 1.5 million dollars in revenue for every hour that the outage continues.22

VI.

Attack Probability
There is potential for terrorist organizations or even state actors to wage an attack on the

undersea cable network for a variety of reasons. This potential for attack or damage is evidenced
by past events in which malicious damage was done to undersea cables. In 2007, following a
provincial decree by the Vietnamese government, several fishing companies were granted
permission to salvage undersea copper cables which were laid prior to 1975 and were no longer
in use.23 In excess of the specific permission granted to gather the defunct cables the fishing
trawlers also pulled up 27 miles of fiber optic cables used to transmit internet traffic between

About the ICPC, INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM., https://www.iscpc.org/about-the-icpc/, (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
22
Michael Sechrist, Cyberspace in Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communication Cables by
Creating an International Public-Private Partnership, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, (Mar. 23,
2010) , https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/PAE_final_draft__043010.pdf.
23
Staff, Vietnamese Fishermen “Salvage” Internet Lines, REUTERS, (June. 7, 2007 1:24 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-cable/vietnamese-fishermen-salvage-internet-linesidUSHAN1727620070607.
21
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Vietnam, Thailand, and Hong Kong.24 The cables were owned by a private Singaporean
telecommunication company which had to replace the stolen lengths of cable at an estimated cost
of 5.8 million dollars. This cost was the amount needed to physically replace the cable and did
not include the amount of money being lost through the decreased or disrupted internet traffic
caused by this cable theft. The perpetrators of this theft were not prosecuted due to lacking
international agreement and treaties regarding such damage. This example of failure to prosecute
crimes carried out against privately owned internet cables are representative of the problem
which prompted the writing of this position paper. It is my position that governments should
come together in an international treaty, like NATO, and design a framework to prosecute
criminals who seek to damage undersea cables. The international community has done little to
address these concerns and rather sits in wait for a major terror or state-initiated incident to
occur.

VII. Parallels to Piracy in International Law
We will now examine how the crime of piracy is handled by international, maritime, and
United States law and make an argument for the meddling and destruction of undersea cables to
be protected under the same type of laws. In the United States the crime of piracy is addressed
within the United States Constitution itself, in Article I §8 Cl. 10: “[t]o define and punish

24

Id.
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Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”.25
Those seeking to commit bad acts or destruction against undersea cables are committing such
acts “on the high seas” which would also fall into the category of “[f]elonies”. Article I §8
established the enumerated powers bestowed upon congress so that they may provide for the
common defense and welfare of the United States. Congress, in 1948 enacted into the U.S. Code
entitled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure” the following: “[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits
the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in
the United States, shall be imprisoned for life”.26

Under international law it is acknowledged by the United Nations that piracy is executed
with the intent to deprive people of property and interrupt activities of commerce.27 Additionally
the motivation for preventing and criminalizing piracy is similar- economics. The economical
difficulties posed by pirates is dwarfed in comparison to the disruptions which could potentially
result from internet connections being destroyed. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) defines and proscribes procedures for nations to combat piracy. In UNCLOS
Article 105 the UN authorizes the military or governmental ships of any state or nation to arrest
pirates and seize their vessels if found outside of the waters of any nation (international

25

U.S. Const. art.I §8 cl. 10.
18 U.S. Code § 1651 (2006)
27
http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy.htm
26
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waters).28 Further the UNCLOS states that the nation which has arrested and seized pirates is
able to decide the punishment for those captured.29 Within the same UNCLOS the United
Nations addresses undersea cables in the sense that they may be laid by nations in international
water and that nations are permitted to repair and maintain these international cables, yet no
protection or prosecutorial procedures (like those for piracy) are set forth. Based upon the time
periods in which laws regarding piracy were created in the United States it is probable that, had
they had the insight, drafters of those laws would have included undersea cables in a protected
class against harmful behaviors. Piracy laws are aimed to protect private ships which are
defenseless for the most part and whose importance to the world economy was evident. There is
virtually no difference; the cables are privately owned and deliver billions if not trillions to the
national and world economy every day through transactions.

VIII. Maritime Sovereignty
The ocean is separated into different sections, or zones, based upon the distance from a
nation’s shoreline. The first zone is known as territorial waters and extends up to 12 nautical
miles from the shore of the nation. The contiguous zone stretches another 12 miles further out
beyond the territorial zone. The third zone is known as the exclusive economic zone and reaches
outward from shores to a maximum of 200 nautical miles. Anything beyond the 200-nautical

28

Convention on the Law of the Sea: Article 105, UNITED NATIONS, 10 December 1982, available
from http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm
29
Id.
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mile point is considered the high seas, also known as international waters. The zone within
economic control is miniscule when considering the long distances which exist between nations,
the distances which intercontinental cables must traverse. It is for this reason that most of the
undersea cable components will be found in international waters and outside of the control of
individual countries. For example, the Coast Guard of the United States is responsible for
patrolling the entire exclusive economic zone of the United States which is 4.5 million miles
square, larger even than the United States which, itself, measures only 3.7 million miles
square.3031 The patrol and security of the coastlines of many countries will likely deter terrorists
and other bad actors from engaging in attacks in those areas closest to shore but there is plenty of
space which frankly cannot be guarded. Therefore, given the fact that the cables run mostly in
international waters, combined with the fact that offenses against them are more likely to take
place outside of the jurisdiction of any nation, would suggest the fact that there should be an
international body responsible for promulgating legislation to punish those who destroy the
cables.

30

U.S. Coast Guard Overview, U.S. COAST GUARD,
https://www.overview.uscg.mil/Portals/6/Documents/PDF/ USCG_Overview.pdf?ver=2016-1021-114442-890, (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
31
State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geo/ reference/state-area.html, (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
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IX.

Prosecuting Piracy and why it Should be Applied to Undersea
Cables
The punishments for terrorists and other actors who destroy cables should be modeled

after those set forth in the United States Code. The code for piracy was challenged in the court
case United States v. Said in which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ultimately ruled
that life imprisonment for piracy under U.S.C. §1651 was not in violation of the eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The court below in Said ruled on
the trial of a group of seven Somalian pirates for illegally boarding another vessel. 32 The pirates
in that case were convicted under §1651 yet the court for the Eastern District of Virginia
declined to impose the mandatory life sentence attached to the statute because they interpreted it
as a violation of the 8th Amendment.33 The lack of international attention on undersea cables
means that people who destroy the cables may have a lesser chance of being prosecuted by
individual countries. There should be a UN- backed agreement which places penalties on
destruction or attempted destruction of the undersea cables. The importance of this type of law
will be exemplified further in the rest of this paper. In most cases the individual terrorist or even
terrorist organization will lack resources and technology to carry out attacks where the cables are
most vulnerable.

32

United States v. Said, 798 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2015)
33
United States v. Said, 798 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2015)
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The vulnerable parts of the deep sea cables are most open to attack from another
agressor- state actors. In the last year major developments have occurred in the threat to internet
cables by state actors, particularly Russia.

X.

Russian and the Threat to Undersea Cables and the Internet
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has had difficulty in establishing a strong set of

armed force branches. In recent years the totalitarian power has begun increases in activity to
grow its naval force and has vowed to have the second largest navy by 2027. See Exhibit D for
an example of the military expenditures as percentage of the GDPs of Russia contrasted with the
United States from 1991 (fall of the USSR) until 2016. As of 2016 Russia spent 5.39 percent of
their GDP on military expenditures up from a low of 2.9 percent in 1998, while the United States
closely outpaced Russian with 3.0 percent in 1998 the US has only spent 3.28 percent in 2016.34
Additionally, with the uptick in military growth for Russia, has been an increased interest in
alternative forms of warfare being explored by the Federation.

On March 15, 2018 new threats to internet security were made apparent in a release by
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US- CERT) which is a division within
the Department of Homeland Security. The theme of this release titled: “US- CERT Alert TA18-

34

Military Expenditure (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2016&locations=RU-US&page&start=1991&view=chart. (This
link features an interactive data sheet which may be changed and adjusted to particular time
periods and countries in order to cross- reference the expenditures on militaries based off of the
gross domestic product (GDP) for each country.)
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074A” outlines the national security threat to infrastructure targets by foreign governments,
specifically Russia. The report states that since March of 2016 Russians have been intentionally
targeting the infrastructure systems of the United States in an apparent effort to destroy,
infiltrate, influence, or disrupt the operation of these systems.35 In an article from December
2017 the Washington Post reported that Russian submarines were discovered conducting
exploration and activity in the North Atlantic Ocean. The activities of these submarines was
specifically close to the undersea cables in that region. According to senior US military officials
the Russian exercises are “part of a more aggressive naval posture that has driven NATO to
revive a Cold War-era command”.36 The focus of the submarines was evident to be connected
with the data lines in the region which can be destructed or in certain circumstances “hacked” in
order to intercept data while not necessarily interrupting connectivity.37 In response to this
suspicious activity by Russia the allies of NATO have begun planning and moving towards
bolstering defensive measures which have not been seen since the cold war.38 These measures

35

Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure
Sectors, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A, (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018).
36
Michael Birnbaum, Russian Submarines are Prowling Around Vital Undersea Cables It’s
Making NATO Nervous, THE WASHINGTON POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarines-are-prowling-around-vitalundersea-cables-its-making-nato-nervous/2017/12/22/d4c1f3da-e5d0-11e7-927ae72eac1e73b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7b7517f09a18, (last visited Mar. 20,
2018).
37
Id.
38
Michael Birnbaum, Facing Russian Threat, NATO Boosts Operations for the First Time Since
the Cold War, THE WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/facing-russian20 |

include increasing the amount of NATO Commands, increasing personnel, and other defensive
measures. NATO plans to increase the amount of submarine detection planes which can be an
early alert system to submarine activities and also plan to increase anti-submarine defense
systems. The Russian government has sparked a renewed interest in their own naval forces by
revamping 13 Cold-War-era submarines beginning in 2014 which has brought the number of
their active submarines to 60 compared to the United States’ 66 active submarines.39 Along with
this renewal of the Russian Navy was the transformation of an older ballistic submarine into
what can essentially be referred to as a underwater carrier with the ability to carry other smaller
submarines all the way to the ocean floor.40 These smaller subs at such depths pose a tangible
threat to undersea cables more so than the terrorist organizations who may not have financing or
equipment to reach those depths. At these depths it is predicted that Russian will either be able to
cut or at the very least monitor and surveil American and NATO internet communications for
information gathering purposes.
In the US-CERT Alert it details how Russian “threat actors” implement various forms of
internet hacks to infiltrate US systems, specifically systems of infrastructure. The CERT defines
two separate types of targets, there are staging targets and intended targets, with the staging

threat-nato-boosts-operations-for-the-first-time-since-the-cold-war/2017/11/08/9b47f542-c49b11e7-9922-4151f5ca6168_story.html?utm_term=.e74cb7386e1e, (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
39
Birnbaum, supra note 36.
40
Id.
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targets acting as a sort of doorway or threshold leading to the true intended targets. These two
types of targets are identical to the relationship between the privately-owned companies which
maintain the undersea cables and the intended targets- the American people. In the CERT
documents it is explained that staging targets usually have a long pre-existing relationship with
the intended targets of the threat actors. The staging targets are mostly organizations (private)
with relatively softer lines of cyber defense when compared to the harder intended targets and
therefore are easier to be compromised.41 The threat actors would compromise the staging targets
systems by using schemes such as “spear phising”42 in order to gain user credentials which are
then paired with a password (obtained by cracking software) in order to enter a system disguised
as a normal and authorized user. At one point the DHS was able to retrieve a screenshot of what
the hackers saw on their end of the process, the image was that of a control program for what
electrical power plant operators use to run machinery in the power plants. See Exhibit A. By
using this control program, the infiltrators could shut off or damage systems used for power
generation, manufacturing, nuclear and water energy, and aviation.43 As noted earlier the internet

41

See Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy, supra note 35.
Id. (“Spear-phising” implements a method of email fraud in which users are sent a seemingly
legitimate email containing a PDF document which has a hyperlink to an external site, when
clicked the user is asked to input email and password information to the site in order to gain
access to documents. The information entered by the user was then collected by threat actors and
used to access target systems, create administrator type accounts which appeared legitimate, and
disable firewalls etc.)
43
Id.
42
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cables in the ocean are owned, operated, and maintained by private companies which may be
more susceptible to infiltration just like the staging targets outlined in the CERT alert.

Michael Sechrist of the Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs stated that the worst case scenario for a hack of the internet cables could be the
following:
What is the nightmare scenario? A hacker penetrates a cable management system, gains
administrative rights, and hacks into the presentation server. Presentation servers can host
webbased [sic] applications for numerous cable operators and handle management system
data for multiple cable systems. Hacking into a presentation server can therefore provide
attackers with access to control of multiple cable management systems. Hackers could
then attain unprecedented toplevel [sic] views of multiple cable networks and data flows,
discover physical cable vulnerabilities, and disrupt and divert data traffic. With that
access, hackers/attackers can gain a potential “kill click” – with a click of a mouse they
can delete wavelengths and, potentially, significantly disrupt or alter global Internet
traffic routes.
This nightmare scenario is all too realistic as the companies which operate the undersea cables
use commonplace operating systems like Linux and Windows.44 The network management
systems which these companies use enable them to remotely control entire cables from a remote
location at the company. These connectivity possibilities make maintaining the lines and
gathering information about the cables very convenient, yet the connections are also vulnerable
to virtual hijacking in a scenario as described above by Mr. Sechrist. 45

44

Garrett Hinck Birnbaum, Cutting the Cord: The Legal Regime Protecting Undersea Cables,
LAWFARE BLOG, (Nov. 21, 2017 7:00 A.M.), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cutting-cord-legalregime-protecting-undersea-cables, (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
45
Id.
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XI.

International Law, the Law of War, and International Humanitarian
Law
Whether their motive is information mining or to attack infrastructures it is evident that

the preventative NATO measures being planned are paramount to the ongoing threat to the
cables. The threat by Russian activities is also an unexplored area of law for the most part. The
term “cyber warfare” is relatively new and also very ambiguous as it relates to attacks by one
country on another. The International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) “applies to cyber operations
occurring during […] or triggering[…] an armed conflict. However, determining the beginning
of an armed conflict remains tricky in situations[…] short of any kinetic use of force.”46 So
basically, given the present-day principles of IHL, a country can launch a cyber-attack such as
interrupting infrastructure communications without maintaining a physical presence in the victim
nation thus not implicating the traditional “Laws of War”.

The Laws of War are part of international law that include s provisions to regulate the
appropriate and justifiable reasons to engage in war between states (jus ad bellum) and the
acceptable conduct during war (jus in bello).47 The goals of these laws of war as part of the
larger picture of IHL, which aim to limit the suffering caused by armed conflict between nation

Cyber-Warfare, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/highlight/cyberwarfare, (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). (The ICRC is a committee by the Red Cross devoted to the
research and education of international humanitarian law, also known as IHL. The committee
seeks to research: the distinctions of civilians and combatants, principles of proportionality,
human rights, different types of conflicts, and state responsibility.)
47
Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello, (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
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states. Yet cyber-attack falls outside of the traditional definition of war and therefore needs to be
addressed on the international level. This uncertainty leaves many openings for very damaging
attacks to occur without invoking consequences on the perpetrators.

The difficulty in defining cyber hacking and attacks as warfare is because traditional
warfare takes place in some physical space while “cyberspace” is a virtual space. This difference
causes a disconnect in the evaluation of such cyber-attacks. The ICRC discusses the various
elements of newly emerging cyber aggression and posits that “[t]he effects of such ‘bloodless’
attacks could obviously be severe – for instance, if power or water supplies were to be
interrupted or if a banking system were to be taken down.”48 It is this leap, from the virtual
actions of foreign nations, to the physical world of a country across an ocean that has lawmakers
and governments not sure how to define this new type of aggression. It is the position of this
paper that such attacks on infrastructure, whether it be internet or a power grid, is a deliberate act
of war by another country. This does not mean that every time a foreign country is found to have
hacked the United States that war drums should sound, yet it is strongly advisable that the US
respond proportionally to such threats to deter escalation.
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ICRC International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in
2015, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/icrc-internationalhumanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts-2015, (last visited April 20,
2018)
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Another major threat of attacks on infrastructure like the undersea cables, both physically
or virtually, is the risk of what are known as “indiscriminate attacks”. The indiscriminate attacks
in the traditional sense are violations of IHL. The International Court of Justice in The Hague,
Netherlands issued an advisory opinion in 1996 regarding the legality of threat or use of nuclear
weapons in which the court discussed indiscriminate attacks. The ICJ serves as the principal
judicial organ of the UN and its purpose is to “settle, in accordance with international law, legal
disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it
by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.”49
Although the opinion is about nuclear weapons the same principles to the indiscriminate
nature of cyber-attack, the ICJ says weapons are prohibited “because of their indiscriminate
effect on combatants and civilians.”50 Cyber weapons should be placed in this same category
because attacks on infrastructure will not be limited to military installation and the accuracy of
such attacks is similar to explosives in that there is peripheral damage to civilians. This
peripheral damage example is strongly exemplified by the ICRC’s Report: ICRC, International
Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015. It states:
Most military networks rely on civilian cyber infrastructure, such as undersea [fiber]optic cables, satellites, routers or nodes. Conversely, civilian vehicles, shipping, and air
traffic controls are increasingly equipped with navigation systems that rely on global
The Court, THE INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/court, (last visited April 21,
2018).
50
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1. C.J. Reports 1996,
THE INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV01-00-EN.pdf, (last visited April 20, 2018).
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positioning system (GPS) satellites, which are also used by the military. Civilian
logistical supply chains (for food and medical supplies) and other businesses use the
same web and communication networks through which some military communications
pass. Thus, it is to a large extent impossible to differentiate between purely civilian and
purely military cyber infrastructures.51

Conclusion
The connectivity of the entire globe relies on about 400 garden-hose-size cables
stretching thousands of miles. The cables, which could at any time be severed and disrupted by
various bad actors, as very vulnerable. Most alarming is that strong evidence points toward a
Russian initiative to bolster their military power, seek alternative non-physical forms of attacks
and to mask responsibility for hacking type attacks. These indicators also point toward a
vulnerability of the undersea internet cables being attacked by Russia in order to limit or cut out
communication within the United States and also between the United States and its allies. The
days of traditional kinetic projectile warfare have not yet gone by the wayside, yet, they are
slowly taking on a secondary spot in the arsenals of advanced nations. During Hurricane Sandy
in 2012, the tri-state felt the effects of having power cut off. In some places power was
extinguished for over a week’s time and we saw the fabric of society begin to stretch thin with
lines at gas stations, bare shelves at supermarkets, and a general panic of the public. The effects
of an infrastructure attack through soft internet targets under the ocean could lead to this very
same discord on a much larger scale.
Although the United States military has taken steps to bolster cyber divisions among the
branches, it is clear that the government also needs to create standards and protocol which
private internet providers need to implement to prevent hacking and attacks like those on the
power plant discussed above. The interconnectedness of the internet is the most powerful tool to
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See Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 48.
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have ever existed, yet this interconnectedness also brings civilian users into the same virtual
space as military users. It is the recommendation of this position paper for the United States to
take initiative to pressure the international community, through the United Nations, to provide
protection to the undersea cables, both physically and virtually, through deterrent measures
including physical force and proportional countermeasures aimed at aggressors (independent and
state actors) to hold them accountable for actions in cyberspace.
Clearly there are several strong arguments included within this paper in support of a push
on the international community to revise the protections of undersea cables. The areas of law and
security must be re-visited to protect the intangible internet traffic which passes through tangible
connections. These cables cover far to vast of an area to not be protected. Just as laws had to be
developed to control aviation when air traffic became a means of transport, the nations of the
world must come together again to react to new developments and create protections and
penalties applicable to the undersea systems.

28 |

Exhibit A: 52
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See Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure
Sectors, supra note 35.
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Exhibit B:53

Exhibit C:54
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https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2016&locations=RUUS&page&start=1991&view=chart
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Exhibit D 55
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